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4	On behalf of other interested parties as 1	isted herein
5	-	
6	IN THE CLID	DEME COUDT
	IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF ARIZONA	
7	51112 0	
8	PETITION TO AMEND RULE 72,	Supreme Court No. R-16-0037
9	ARIZONA RULES OF FAMILY LAW PROCEDURE	COMMENT TO PETITION TO
10	LAW PROCEDURE	AMEND ARIZ. R. FAM. L. P. 72
11		REQUEST FOR HEARING ON
12		PETITION
13		J
14	Pursuant to Rule 28, Rules of the	Supreme Court, the below signed Arizona
15		
16	State Bar Certified Family Law Special	ists, the Arizona Chapter of The American
	Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, wi	th the members listed individually herein
17		
18	and as a Chapter, and numerous famil	y law attorneys (hereinafter the "Group")
19	provide the following comments to the	Petition for Rule 72 of the Arizona Rules
20		
	of Family Law Procedure submitted by	Judges Swann and McMurdie on May 18
21	2016 (hereinafter "Proposed Amendm	ent"). The Group also submits its own
22	(1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	,
23	proposed amendment to Rule 72	
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I. Introduction

First, the Proposed Amendment significantly affects the ability of a trial court to address complex or difficult family law matters by removing a trial court's ability to appoint a special master, over the objection of one party, during litigation. The removal of this ability is concerning given the significant issues with the parties' ability to secure sufficient trial time in Maricopa County. Removal of this resource will have a detrimental effect on the family court system as a whole.

Second, the Proposed Amendment also eliminates the trial court's ability to utilize special masters for any child related issues, other than the limited issues under ARFLP 74.

The Group therefore has taken into account the concerns addressed in the Proposed Amendment, and incorporate those concerns into a separate proposal. This proposal ("Group Proposal") satisfies the concerns addressed in the Proposed Amendment, while utilizing the recently adopted special master language from ARCP 53, which underwent significant vetting during the recent amendments to the Civil Rules. The Group believes that the Proposed Amendment, as modified herein, accomplishes all the goals identified by Judges Swann and McMurdie, while allowing for continued use, in limited circumstances, of family law masters over one party's objection.

Last, special masters exist in every area of law at both the state and federal level. Selectively removing the ability to use this resource over one party's objection in family court only puts practitioners, and more importantly, litigants, at a disadvantage and potentially creates due process issues due to the lack of adequate trial time.

II. Background of issues related to need for special masters

The Proposed Amendment and the Group Proposal must be seen in the light of the reality of the family court system, given what is currently occurring, specifically in Maricopa County. To put it simply, trial courts are limiting the amount of trial time to an extent that it is nearly impossible to conduct any trial within the time allowed. While the excessive limitation on trial time has resulted in multiple cases being remanded back to the trial court due to the limitations on trial time, these practices continue, and are of serious concern, especially in Maricopa County. The case of *Volk v. Brame*, 235 Ariz 462, 333 P.3d. 789 (App. 2014) illustrated the issues with the lack of trial time in Arizona as follows:

¶1 This case requires us to reaffirm the importance of due process in family court.

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. . .

¶21 Though the court may impose time limits that appear reasonable in advance of a proceeding, those limits become unreasonable if they prove insufficient to allow a substantive hearing. If, during the progress of a scheduled hearing, it becomes apparent that the court lacks sufficient time to receive adequate testimony, then

the court must allow reasonable additional time or continue the hearing to permit it to perform its essential tasks.⁴

In this case, it appears that the court felt constrained by the nature of its Tuesday and Wednesday calendars to limit the entire proceeding to a period of minutes despite the large quantity of evidence that required review. Whatever procedures the court adopts to organize and manage busy calendars, however, it can never lose sight of its fundamental obligation to afford due process to all parties. In some cases, this requirement will trump uniform case-management schemes.

The result of the *Volk* case, and the time constraints imposed in that hearing are not unique. The *Volk* decision has been utilized repeatedly to overturn trial court decisions where time constraints were imposed. Although *Volk* provides a remedy, that remedy is not always being consistently adhered to by the trial courts, and many litigants cannot afford the appellate review process to remedy any wrongs. The issue remains that few cases can ever afford appellate review, and while *Volk* may provide a remedy, it is the exception and not the rule.

III. Comments and suggested modification for Proposed Amendment

The Proposed Amendment lists the following concerns that necessitate amending the current rule. The Group responds to each concern and demonstrates how the Group Proposal not only solves the concerns, but addresses the concern without decimating the current Rule:

Appointment without Agreement

One of the issues addressed in the Proposed Amendment is the trial court's appointment of a special master without a stipulation of the parties. The language of the Proposed Amendment is as follows:

A. Appointment and Compensation. Upon written stipulation by the parties and application by the parties, or on the court's own motion or oral agreement on the record in open court, the court may appoint a family law master who is an attorney or other professional with education, experience, and special expertise regarding the particular issues to be referred to the master.

The Group agrees that the court should not appoint a master if both parties do not believe one should be appointed. This is a derogation of the trial court's duty to hear the matter over the desires of the parties.

The issue arises when one of the parties requests a master, for issues such as discovery or to ensure that there is sufficient trial time for a complex issue, when the court is incapable of allowing for the time needed, or when expediency is an issue. Asking the obstructive party to agree to a method that will hold him/her accountable is an axiomatic request, and one to which they will never consent.

The current civil rule, ARCP 53, utilizes language that accomplishes the goal of the Proposed Amendment, while continuing to allow masters in defined and limited circumstances. ARCP 53 states:

1	(a) Appointment.
2	(1) <i>Scope</i> . Unless a statute provides otherwise, a
3	court may appoint a master only to:
4	(A) perform duties consented to by the
5	parties;
6	(B) hold trial proceedings and make or
7	recommend findings of fact and conclusions of law on issues to be decided
8	without a jury if appointment is warranted
9	by:
10	(i) some exceptional condition; or
11	(ii) the need to perform an accounting
12	or resolve a difficult computation of damages; or
13	
14	(C) address pretrial and post-trial matters that cannot be effectively and timely
15	addressed by an available superior court
16	judge in the county in which the court sits.
17	The Group Proposal modifies the Proposed Amendment's language to accomplish
18	both tasks, as follows:
19	A. Appointment and Compensation. The court may
20	appoint a family law master who is an attorney or other
21	professional with education, experience, and special expertise regarding the particular issues to be referred to the master,
22	upon either of the following:
23	1. Upon <u>written</u> stipulation <u>by the parties</u> and
24	application by the parties, or on the court's own motion
25	or oral agreement on the record in open court, to perform the duties consented to by the parties. Compensation to be allowed to a family law master shall be fixed by the

court. The parties may stipulate to a particular family law master and the amount of compensation, but the court must approve the family law master and compensation, and the court shall review the qualifications of the family law master prior to appointment. Compensation of the family law master shall be allocated by the court and shall be treated as a recoverable cost.

Upon written motion by either party only if 2. warranted by: (a) some exceptional condition; or (b) the need to resolve complex matters, or (c) to address pretrial and post-trial matters that cannot be addressed effectively and timely by an available superior court judge in the county in which the court sits. Before making such appointment, the court shall also consider the fairness of imposing the likely expenses on the parties and the appointment order must protect against unreasonable expenses given the income, assets and issues to be heard by the master. Appointment of a master must not create a financial hardship on the parties. The court shall set financial limitations that are proportional to the size of the estate and the issues to be resolved. Compensation of the family law master shall be set by the court, and allocated by the court and treated as a recoverable cost.

The Group Proposal accomplishes the purpose of the Proposed Amendment, while allowing for limited use of family law masters over the objection of one party, and only after an analysis of the complexity of the case, the parties' ability to pay for such expense, and after determination that the expense will be proportional.

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The introductory portion of Paragraph A, and Sub-Paragraph A1., in whole, substantially mirror the Proposed Amendment, however, the order and layout is changed slightly. The Group does not oppose the Proposed Amendment on these points.

Appointment of masters on child related issues

The Group agrees with the proposal that Rule 72 should not be an end run around the current Rule 74, to accomplish what the prior Rule 74 allowed. But at the same time, should the parties agree, there is no reason that the parties should not be able to appoint a master on child related issues, such as parenting time or legal decision-making. The Proposed Amendment cites to issues under *Nold v. Nold*, 232 Ariz. 270, 304 P.3d 1093, (App. 2013), where the Court of Appeals held that:

the family court delegated its obligation to independently weigh the evidence in determining the children's best interests to the evaluator. See DePasquale v. Superior Court (Thrasher), 181 Ariz. 333, 336, 890 P.2d 628, 631 (App.1995). The family court "can neither delegate a judicial decision to an expert witness nor abdicate its responsibility to exercise independent judgment. The best interests of the child ... are for the [family] court alone to decide." Id. By using the report as the baseline for custody, the family court delegated its judicial decision to the evaluator, abdicated its responsibility to decide the best interests of the children, and therefore abused its discretion.

Id. at 273, 304 P.3d. at 1096.

While *Nold* states that a trial court cannot blindly adopt the findings of an expert, that is not the same as utilizing a special master to conduct a proceeding. Experts are not quasi-judicial officers, and the rule still allows for judicial review of special master recommendations.

The Proposed Amendment states:

B. Powers. The order of reference appointing a family law master shall specify the particular issues referred to

the family law master and shall fix the time and place for beginning and closing the hearings and for filing the master's report. An appointment under this rule may not direct a master to perform services within the scope of otherwise decisions Rule 74 or make recommendations concerning legal decision making or parenting time. Other than legal decision making and parenting time, The master may deal with any issues pursuant to Title 25, A.R.S., that could be presented to the assigned judge including post-decree matters. Subject to any limitations in the order, the master shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before the master and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the master's duties under the order. The master may require the production of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference. The master may rule upon the admissibility of evidence, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, and has the authority to place witnesses under oath and may examine the parties and witnesses. When a party requests, the master shall cause a record to be made of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in Rule 104, Arizona Rules of Evidence, for a court sitting without a jury. The cost of the record shall be paid by the parties as allocated by the court and shall be a treated as a recoverable cost.

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The Group Proposal would continue to allow for masters for child issues, only by agreement, as follows:

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B. Powers. The order of reference appointing a family law master shall specify the particular issues referred to the family law master and shall fix the time and place for

beginning and closing the hearings and for filing the master's report. An appointment under this rule may not direct a master to perform services within the scope of Rule 74 or otherwise make decisions or recommendations concerning legal decision making or parenting time. Other than legal decision making and parenting time, Tthe THE master may deal with any issues pursuant to Title 25, A.R.S., that could be presented to the assigned judge including post-decree matters BUT MAY ONLY ADDRESS PARENTING TIME AND LEGAL DECISION-MAKING ISSUES APPOINTED BY STIPULATION UNDER **SECTION** A(1). Subject to any limitations in the order, the master shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before the master and to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the master's duties under the order. The master may require the production of evidence upon all matters embraced in the reference. The master may rule upon the admissibility of evidence, unless otherwise directed by the order of reference, and has the authority to place witnesses under oath and may examine the parties and witnesses. When a party requests, the master shall cause a record to be made of the evidence offered and excluded in the same manner and subject to the same limitations as provided in Rule 104, Arizona Rules of Evidence, for a court sitting without a jury. The cost of the record shall be paid by the parties as allocated by the court and shall be a treated as a taxable cost.

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To accomplish the required review necessary to satisfy the Nold case, the Group

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Proposal also includes a change to Section H, as follows:

H. Stipulation as to Findings. At the time the master is appointed, the parties may stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final. When so stipulated, the court shall consider only questions of law arising from the master's report. Absent such a stipulation, the court shall not reverse the special master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and shall review conclusions of law de novo. FOR PARENTING TIME OR LEGAL **DECISION-MAKING ISSUES** THE **COURT** SHALL **DECIDE ALL OBJECTIONS** BY REVIEWING **FINDINGS OF FACT** OR RECOMMENDATIONS DE NOVO PURSUANT TO A.R.S. § 25-401, ET SEQ., TO DETERMINE IF THE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE IN THE CHILD'S **INTERESTS** THE UNLESS **PARTIES** STIPULATE THE FINDINGS OF THE MASTER WILL BE FINAL.

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IV. Summary of Proposed Amendment

The Group's proposed amendments would substantially conform ARFLP 72 to the existing Civil Rule under ARCP 53.

V. Request for Public Hearing under Rule 28(H)

Given the breadth of the concern with this Rule change, as shown by the significant number of parties that make up the Group, this proposal requires a public hearing. Accordingly, the Group requests that the Court set a public hearing on the matter.

Conclusion

The Group submits proposed modifications to the Proposed Amendment in an effort to assist the Court with a rational amendment given the Group's knowledge, experience and expertise in representing parties and appearing before

the Courts of this State in family law matters. The members of the Group 1 2 represent practitioners who are experts in this field, and organizations, such as the Arizona Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, that practice 3 at the highest level of competence in family law. While the Group recognizes that 4 not every case nor request necessitates the appointment of a family law master, this 5 useful and valuable resource should be left available to the parties and the Court. 6 The Group requests that the Proposed Amendment be adopted with the 7 incorporation of the modifications proposed by the Group herein. 8 9 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of July, 2016. 10 11 By /s/ Barry Brody 12 Barry Brody#+ 13 Barry L. Brody, P.C. 5050 East Thomas Road 14 Phoenix, Arizona 85018 15 blb@divorceaz.com 16 17

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1	The following join in, support and endorse the Comment to Petition to
2	Amend Ariz.R.Fam.L.P. 72 and Request for Hearing on Petition:
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5	By: /s/ Stephen R. Smith* President, Arizona Chapter of AAML
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16	Electronic copy filed with the Clerk
17	of the Supreme Court of Arizona this
18	5 th day of July, 2016.
19	By: /s/ ANNETTE T. BURNS
20	by. 787 ANNETTE T. BURNS
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22	*Signed with electronic authorization.
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